



After five years teetering on the brink, the savings
and loan (S&l) industry finally appears to be re-
gaining its health. Yet a numberofrecent articles
in the financial press have implied that the appar-
entimprovementis notas substantial as the records
might indicate. These articles attribute distortions
to special accountingtechniques used by the S&l
industry. This Letter examines those accounting
techniques and, moreimportantly, the use ofstan-
dard book value accounting. On the basis ofa
market valuation ofS&l portfolios, the industry
remains in an extremely weak financial condition
despite the considerable progress ithas made
since the darkest days of 1981-82.
Hard limes
TheS&l industryas awhole has fared poorlyover
the last five years. Standard indicatorsofthe indus-
try's condition such as profitability and recorded
networth position reveal a pronounced and dra-
matic deterioration between 1979 and 1982. The
industry's profitability, as measured by the ratio of
netincometototal assets, stood at anear-postwar-
high of0.82 percent in 1978. By 1980 that ratio
had fallen to 0.13 percent. Then, in 1981 and
1982, the industry recorded major losses; it just
barelyreturned to profitabilityin 1983. The results
for the first halfof 1984 were still poor as net
income amounted to 0.24 percentofassets and
morethan 20percentofall S&lsactuallyreported
losses for the period.
The reason for the industry's exceptionally low
profitability overthe last five years is its large
exposure to interest rate risk. Traditionally, S&ls
have relied on short-term liabilities to fund long-
term, fixed-rate assets consisting primarilyof
mortgages. For example, in 1982, well over 50
percentofthe industry's liabilities paid market-
determined rates and matured in less than one
year while onlyabout 20 percent o(assets had
similarcharacteristics. The mismatch between the
maturities (technically, repricing periods) ofthe
industry's assets and liabilities leftS&ls vulnerable
tothe high level ofinterestrates that has prevailed
since 1979.
The industry's average costoffunds increased
with the rise in the overall level ofinterest rates,
while the average yield on earning assets rose
much moresluggishly. The resulting pressure on
S&ls' net interest margins had adevastatingeffect
on earnings, particularly in 1981 and 1982. The
subsequent decline in interest rates and the resul-
tant increase in mortgage loan demand in 1983
provided substantial relieffor net interestmargins,
but was notsufficientto restore financial health.
Rapid growth in loan loss expense, in particular,
began to plague the industry in 1982-83. Delin-
quent payments on existing loans soared and the
defaultrate morethan doubled between 1981 and
1983. Poor economic conditions in general, and
sagging housing prices in particular, caused
much ofthis deterioration in asset quality. The
high growth strategy followed by perhaps 5to 10
percent (accordingto the Federal Homeloan
Bank Board) ofS&ls compounded the problem.
These S&ls, includingsome ofthe largest in the
industry, sought to overcome pressure on interest
margins through rapid growth in an attemptto
"swamp" the lowaverage yield on existing mort-
gages with much higheryieldson newmortgages.
In manycases, interestmargins improveddramati-
callybutbecause underwritingstandards were
relaxed, asset qualitydeteriorated substantially
and contributed to reduced profitability.
Five years oflowornegativeprofitabilitycaused a
serious deterioration in the industry's networth
position. In 1979, the industry'soverall recorded
net worth stood at 6.1 percent ofliabilities-a
level regulators considered to be a comfortable
bufferagainst adverse circumstances. By the end
of 1982 that level had shrunk to 3.8 percentof
liabilities. Since then, some improvement in prof-
itability has boosted networth to 4.1 percentof
liabilities as ofJune 30,1984, butthe industry's
rapid growth in 1983-84 has limited the extent to
which recorded capital ratios can be increased.
The industry's recorded net worth position, weak
as it is, does not reveal the full extentofS&ls'
vulnerability. Included in that net worth figure is a
sizeable proportion of"intangible" assets and
otherbookkeepingitems, the inclusion ofwhich is
not in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP). These principlesFABSF
require that claims (net worth) against assets be
recorded onlyiftheunderlyingassets have"book-
able" value (i.e., marketable value). Moreover, •
recorded net worth also is overstated because it
excludes a serious deterioration in the market
value ofthe industry's net long-term asset position.
Accountingtechniques
Underregulatory accounting principles (RAP),
S&ls have been permitted to count as networth
such items as net-worth certificates, "appraised
equity capital," and intangible assets arisingfrom
deferral and purchase accounting.
Net-worth certificates wereauthorized by the
Garn-StGermain Depository Institutions Actof
1982 to provide weak institutionswith capital
assistance to keep them from failing. Targeted
institutions issue capital instruments, called "net
worth certificates," that are purchased by the
Federal Savings and loan Insurance Corporation
(FSUC). The FSUC, in turn, gives the issuing insti-
tution a promissory note having the same face
value. Since no newfunds are generated, this
transaction amounts essentially to an exchangeof
paper. Ifan issuing institution fails, however, the
FSUC's promissory note is available as an asset to
satisfy the claims against that institution. As of
December31,1983, these certificates had been
used by a relatively small numberofinstitutions
and accounted for $1 billion ofthe industry's $31
billion networth. AccordingtoGMp, however,
this figure should beexcluded from net worth
calculations sincethe FSUC's promissory notes
held by the industryonlyhave bookablevalue in
the eventofan institution'sfailure and forced
liquidation.
Appraised equitycapital, the difference between
the book value (historical cost) and appraised
valueofS&ls' land and officebuildings, is another
componentofregulatory net worth. The Federal
Homeloan Bank Board (FHlB8) requires those
institutions participating in the FSUC's networth
certificateprogramtoadd appraised equitycapital
to theirnet worth calculations, and consequently,
morethan $1 billionofS&ls'recorded networth is
generated bythisitem. However,appraised equity
capital is not recognized underGMP. The ac-
counting profession does not recognize real prop-
ertyappreciation untiltheproperty is actuallysold
because, it is felt, appraised value is extremely
subjectiveand its selectiveusecan lead todeliber-
ate misrepresentations.
The practiceofincludingin networththevalue of
intangibleassets arisingfrom thepurchaseofother
S&ls (purchasing accounting) and from deferred
losses on securitiestransactions (deferral account-
ing) has also been criticized as distortionary.
Underpurchaseaccounting, theacquirerofa(fail-
ing) S&l records the acquired assets at their pur-
chased price. Because theaveragecontract interest
rate on the acquired portfoliois less than prevailing
market rates, however, the market value ofthe
acquired assets is generally substantially less than
their recorded values. Thus, to balance the ac-
counting records, itwould seem properto record
this capital depreciation as adecrease in the
acquired institution'Scapital (networth)accounts.
Purchase accounting, by'contra.st, permits the
acquirer to treat this depreciation as "goodwill,"
an intangible asset, that until recently could be
amortized over a period ofuptoforty years.
Clearly, this practice enabled the acquirerofa
failing S&lto overstate its net worth position,
although accounting rules have been changed to
reduce the attractiveness ofpurchase accounting,
particularly in cases wherefailing institutions are
involved.
In the same way that purchase accounting has
enabled S&lsto defer capital losses on acquired
loans, deferral accounting permits S&ls to defer
the recognition oflosses on the sale ofexisting
loans and securities. Under deferral accounting,
which is permissable under RAP butnot under
GAAP, an S&l can sell existing loans and securi-
ties that have depreciated in value relative to their
recorded values and record this depreciation as an
intangibleasset amortized overaperiodofseveral
years. Such a practice clearly enables the S&lto
overstate its networth position. Because of
apparent abuses, however, the FHlBB recently
proposed thatdeferral accounting be limited to
loans and securities that were acquired priorto
November 1984.
Although exactfigures are notavailable, these two
categories ofintangible assets amounted tomore
than $20billion asofDecember 31 ..1983. Netting
this figure and the $2 billion in net worth certifi-
cates and appraised equity capital yields a net
worth position equal to 1.2 percent (as opposed to
the recorded 4.1 percent)ofliabilitiesattheend of
1983. Itmay be hard to understand why the
industry's regulators haveallowed and even
encouraged this sortofmisrepresentationoffinan-
cial condition. However, the FHlBB has deemedthese sorts ofimplicitand explicitcapital assis-
tanceprograms necessarytogivethe industrytime
to work through its problems and to restructure its
portfolio. Deferral accounting, for example, en-
ables an S&L to sell low-yielding assets without
havingto recognizeimmediate capitallosswhich
could otherwise wipe out its networth.
Marketvalue net worth
Actually, had the industry been valuing its port-
folio at market values instead ofbook values, its
financial condition would have appeared weaker
still. Given the large proportion oflow-yielding
fixed rate assets held in S&Ls' portfolios at par
value-an amount that far exceeds similar long-
termliabilities-itis likelythatrecorded networth
(even after adjusting for RAP distortions) seriously
overstates the marketvalue ofthe industry's net
worth position.
A numberofeconomists have attempted to esti.,.
mate the extent ofthis overstatement. In articles
published bythe Federal Reserve Bank ofBoston,
Kopcke estimated that atthe peak in interest rates
(mid-1981), the industry's networth to asset ratio
was possibly as low as -10 percent when the pres-
entvalueofthe industry'sassets and Iiabilitieswas
taken into consideration. Using a slightlydifferent
approach, Kane (Housing Finance Review, July
1982) calculated the proportionate shortfall in the
yield on the industry's mortgages relative to the
prevailingmortgage rate. This he interpreted as an
estimate ofthe percentage decline in the value of
the industry's mortgage portfolio relative to its
book value. Hefound that atthe end of 1980, the
industry's unrealized losses amounted to 20 per-
cent ofthe bookvalue oftotal assets.
Thus, using Kane's approach to estimate the cur-
rent marketvalueofS&Ls' net worth yields a net
worth ratioof-3.7' percent as ofDecember 31,
1983. Although still negative, thisfigure represents
a significantimprovementoverthe industry'scon-
dition in 1980, since in 1983, unrealized losses
amountedto 7.5 percentofassets, compared to20
percent in 1980.
Admittedly, Kane's approach tends to overstate
unrealized losses because itdoes nottake into
consideration gains on the industry's other assets
(e.g., real property) or liabilities (the value of
fixed-term liabilitiesalsofalls as interestrates rise),
nor does ittake into accountdifferences in the
prepaymentcharacteristics ofseasoned versus
new mortgages. These factors, however, are not
likelyto create too serious a bias.
The difference between the industry's recorded
net worth position (4.1 percent) and Kane's esti-
mated marketvalue networth position (-3.7 per-
cent) represents an enormous distortion. Itsug-
gests that the outlookforS&Ls remains clouded at
best withouta further sizeable drop in interest
rates. It is likelythatthe industry, which has al-
ready lost morethan 700 of its numberthrough
mergers and liquidations, will continuetoexperi-
ence large-scale consolidation. The process ofre-
structuringS&L portfolios, forwhich theregulators
havetriedtobuytime,will likewisecontinueto be
a slow and painful one.
Barbara Bennett
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect theviewsofthe managementofthe Federal Reserve BankofSan
Francisco,orofthe Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorialcommentsmaybe addressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....FreecopiesofFederal Reserve publications
can be obtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,San Francisco
94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.uo~6u!4S0m 4o~n U060JO OpOA0U





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 187,457 724 11,432 6.8
Loans and Leases1 6 168,821 824 13,466 09.1
Commercial and Industrial 52,809 223 6,846 15.8
Real estate 61,564 59 2,665 4.8
Loans to Individuals 31,212 210 4,561 18.1
Leases 5,050 - 1 - 13 - 0.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,603 - 28 - 904 - 7.6
Other Securities2 7,033 - 72 - 1,130 - 14.6
Total Deposits 194,509 5,440 3,512 1.9
Demand Deposits 46,946 4,141 - 2,291 - 4.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,735 1,843 - 596 - 2.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,065 865 290 2.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,498 434 5,513 4.5
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,506 499 909 2.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 40,424 - 160 2,259 6.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,299 397 - 708 - 3.2
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Fi2ures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephonetransfers
s Includes borrowingvia FRB, IT&Lnotes, Fed Funds, RPs and othersources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange